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Abstract 
This paper provides the first empirical network analysis of the Argentine interbank money 
market. Its main topological features are examined applying graph theory, focusing on the 
unsecured overnight loans settled from 2003 to 2017. The network, where banks are the 
nodes and the operations between them represent the links, exhibits low density, a higher 
reciprocity than comparable random graphs, short average distances and its clustering 
coefficient remains above that of a random network of equal size. Furthermore, the network 
is prominently disassortative. Its structural metrics experienced significant volatility, in 
correlation with the economic activity fluctuations and regulatory shifts. Signs of nodes’ 
random-like behavior are detected during contractions. The degree distributions fit better to 
a Lognormal distribution than to a Poisson or a Power Law. Additionally, different node 
centrality measures are computed. It is found that a higher centrality enables a node to settle 
more convenient bilateral interest rates compared to the average market rate, identifying a 
statistical and economically significant effect by means of a regression analysis. These 
results constitute a relevant input for systemic risk assessment and provide solid empirical 
foundations for future theoretical modelling and shock simulations, especially in the context 
of underdeveloped financial systems. 
JEL Classification: D85, G21, G28 
Keywords: Network Analysis, Interbank Market, Interbank rates, Systemic risk 
1. Introduction 
Financial entities exhibit a high degree of interdependence. They forge interlinkages via both sides 
of their balance sheets, which are essential for efficient financial intermediation. The 2008 global 
turmoil underscored the necessity of a more rigorous comprehension of the systemic risks 
associated with these interconnections among banks. Additionally, those events highlighted the 
central role played by interbank money markets for a correct functioning of financial systems and 
for the effectiveness of monetary policies. 
Network analysis and graph theory provide an insightful framework to address these complex 
interrelationships. This approach allows us to better understand phenomena like contagion, 
network externalities, cascade failures, etc., which have been highly emphasized by recent 
literature specialized in financial stability [1, 2]. 
This paper provides the first comprehensive network analysis of the Argentine interbank 
market. Specifically, it examines the topological structure of the unsecured money market, known 
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as call market. Banks conduct the management of a portion of their short-term liquidity positions 
through it. The average interest rate agreed, named call rate, represents a fundamental reference 
of the “cost of money” in Argentina. This short-term rate is a key benchmark for the determination 
of other longer-term rates in the economy. For this reason, the call market embodies one of the 
most direct transmission channels at disposal of the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) to 
implement its monetary policy. Hence the importance of examining the structural features of this 
network of loans, with the aim of assessing its stability and systemic risks. 
Research on the Argentine interbank markets is extremely scarce. No previous work has 
focused on them, except for that of Anastasi, Elosegui and Sangiácomo [3], who studied the 
determinants of the call rate applying econometric methods for panel data. Therefore, the present 
study represents an initial milestone for the exploration of the domestic banking system from the 
vantage perspective of graph theory. 
Thus, the call market is represented as a network, where financial institutions are nodes and 
the overnight loans among them are links. Its main structural features are analyzed from 1 January 
2003 to 31 December 2017, based on a rich data set of daily transactions stored by the BCRA, in 
order to investigate if it shows similarities with stylized network models and to detect changes in 
their evolution over the years. This task enables us to draw conclusions, for instance, about its 
resilience to different types of disruptive events. 
This line of empirical research has been growing extensively in the world since the early 
2000s, along with the development of computational technologies and a larger availability of 
suitable data sets for applying these methods. Comparable studies were carried out on the money 
market networks of several countries, such as Italy [4, 5], U.S.A. [6], or Switzerland [7], just to 
name a few. 
Argentina is a middle-income country with one of the smallest financial systems in South 
America. The country has experienced substantial macroeconomic volatility, coupled with sudden 
and sharp swings in financial regulation during the period under analysis (including financial 
repression and subsequent liberalization). Hence, the study of the Argentine financial network’s 
dynamics in such a long and turbulent timeframe represents a good opportunity to gauge the 
responses of an underdeveloped system to multiple environments and distress events. 
The 15-year time span addressed in this paper is one of the longest intervals examined thus 
far, when compared to the existing empirical studies on financial networks. We analytically 
subdivided this period into six different stages. This approach allows us to explore more accurately 
the variability experienced by the network structure throughout these years, which, to some extent, 
tended to move together with the macroeconomic fluctuations of Argentina’s economy. 
The next section explains the main institutional arrangements of the Argentine call market, 
the different monetary policy instruments and the minimum liquidity requirements imposed by the 
BCRA, which impact directly on money markets. Section 3 summarizes the most relevant findings 
of previous empirical literature on financial networks, providing a benchmark for our own 
estimates. Section 4 describes the database used. The methodological framework is explained in 
Section 5. The results are outlined in Section 6. Section 7 presents an econometric regression aimed 
at quantifying the effects derived from node centrality on banks’ capability for negotiating more 
convenient interest rates on their bilateral transactions in the call market. Finally, Section 8 lists 
some concluding remarks and lines of research for future work. 
2. The Argentine interbank money market 
The call market is the Argentine traditional interbank market in which banks negotiate their 
liquidity positions with each other. The daily average interest rate of these transactions represents 
one of the most relevant short-term rates in the economy. The loans in this market are unsecured 
and are agreed between entities by telephone trading. Banks define bilaterally the interest rate of 
the transaction. Only institutions authorized by the BCRA can operate in this market. The vast 
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majority of the loans are overnight, although a few longer-term transactions also take place. 
Financial institutions make a risk assessment of each possible counterparty and then define specific 
credit lines for each one (mainly, they determine the limit amount of money to be granted). Hence, 
when an entity needs liquid funds, it resorts in the first place to those banks with which it has credit 
lines available. This gives rise to repeated interactions between pairs of agents in the market. 
The bilateral transactions are compensated through the real-time gross settlement system 
called “MEP” (stands for “Medio Electrónico de Pagos”), which is administered by the BCRA. 
The transfers of funds are not subjected to settlement risks because the monetary authority verifies, 
before the settlement of each loan, the existence of the required funds in the accounts involved. 
In Argentina, there is another complementary market in which the financial institutions can 
negotiate their liquidity positions, known as “REPO market”. In contrast, this is a secured market 
and transactions are conducted through an electronic platform. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to 
fulfill several costly conditions to operate in this market, referred to the volume of assets and equity 
of the bank (among others), which are often impossible to meet by a significant number of entities. 
These barriers to entry explain, at least partially, the substantial role played by the call market in 
the local financial system. Unfortunately, the necessary information to analyze the REPO market 
is not available yet, so this study will focus only on the call market. 
Due to the call rate’s key role as a benchmark for other interest rates, the BCRA has developed 
several instruments to influence its behavior. Since 2002 (in a context of a public debt default), 
the monetary authority started to issue its own short-term securities, called LEBAC and NOBAC. 
These securities were designed to absorb or provide liquidity from/to the market, affecting 
therefore the interest rates and monetary conditions of the economy. In addition, since 2004, the 
BCRA began to operate actively in the REPO market. A Central Bank’s repo is a secured loan to 
a financial institution, while a reverse repo is the opposite transaction. Usually, these loans have a 
maturity of 1 or 7 days. Fig.1A shows the evolution of the call rate during these years, jointly with 
the interest rates of the BCRA’s most relevant monetary policy instruments. 
2.1. Macroeconomic context 
Money markets in Argentina have faced wide fluctuations during the years under examination, 
along with the macroeconomic volatility experienced by the country. For that reason, the time 
period studied is analytically subdivided into six stages, defined according to the development of 
exogenous factors that affected crucially the interbank market (Fig.1B). This approach is useful to 
detect similarities, breaks and continuities in the evolution of its structural features over time. 
 
Fig.1. (A) Call rate and interest rates of monetary policy instruments (source: BCRA). *The Figure includes 
only the interest rates of the LEBACs with the shortest duration in each moment, provided that they are 
shorter than 105 days. (B) Argentina Monthly Economic Activity Estimator (EMAE), seasonally adjusted 
(source: INDEC). Vertical spotted lines demarcate the six different time stages considered for the analysis. 
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The first stage comprises the lapse before the public debt restructuring, between January 2003 
and June 2005. The economy was starting to recover from the deep 2001-02 crisis and the financial 
system was facing many obstacles to its functioning, because of the widespread bank runs suffered 
in the previous years and due to the debt default, which hindered local operations of international 
entities. Within this first stage, the year 2003 is notably different from 2004, for two main reasons. 
In general, the economic situation of Argentina was considerably healthier during the latter, but 
the other relevant factor was that in 2004 the REPO market was established, which provided 
additional tools for managing liquidity to a still weakened domestic financial system. 
Stage 2 is defined between July 2005 and December 2007, a period in which the economy 
was buoyant, after the debt restructuring and the surge in commodity prices. Then, Stage 3 includes 
the outbreak of the 2008 global crisis and its subsequent impact on Argentina (it is delimited 
between January 2008 and February 2010). The main effects of the crisis took place in the first 
half of 2009, and it was not until the second half of that year that the economy began to rebound. 
The fourth stage reviews the recovery from the crisis, characterized by a strengthened economic 
activity together with the worsening of both fiscal and external deficits (“twin deficits”). It is 
defined between March 2010 and October 2011. 
By the end of October 2011, the government established harsh FX controls, introducing 
radical changes in regulatory frameworks, especially in the financial system. Capital mobility was 
strongly restricted and many regulations were imposed on banks’ interest rates. Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has stagnated since then, giving rise to a period of recurrent macroeconomic 
recessions. The fifth stage covers these years, between November 2011 and November 2015. The 
call rate’s volatility exacerbated during that lapse (see Fig.1A). Since December 2015 until the end 
of the sample period, FX and interest rate controls were completely relaxed. These last two years 
are included in Stage 6. An Inflation Targeting regime was established, and the BCRA used a 
monetary policy rate as its main instrument to manage the monetary conditions of the economy. 
In this context, the call rate reduced dramatically its volatility and progressively resumed a more 
similar behavior to the one displayed before 2012. 
Table 1. Analytical time stages 
 
The number of financial entities decreased almost monotonically during the years under 
analysis. Starting from a total of 100 in January 2003, only 77 were active in December 2017 (Fig. 
2). We employ a usual classification in the domestic financial system to study the dynamics of 
different types of banks in the network. It divides them into four subgroups, according to the owner 
of the institution: State-Owned Banks (SOBs), Domestic Private Banks (DPBs), Subsidiaries of 
Foreign Banks (SFBs) and Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs). This classification, based on 
the structure and ownership of the institutions’ equity, is also useful as a proxy for the specific 
type of financial businesses run by each entity. The number of institutions decreased in all the 
subgroups, but the SFBs declined the most, going from 28 banks in 2003 to 16 in 2017.  
Stage Period Main Events
1 January 2003 - June 2005 Debt default. Beginnings of economic recovery.
2 July 2005 - December 2007 Debt Restructuring. Bouyant economy.
3 January 2008 - February 2010 Global financial crisis.
4 March 2010 - October 2011 Macroeconomic recovery. Twin deficits widening.
5 November 2011 - November 2015 FX-market restrictions. Interest rate controls.
6 December 2015 - December 2017 FX-market and financial liberalization. Inflation Targeting Regime.
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Fig. 2. Number of entities in the financial system, by type (source: BCRA). DPBs: Domestic Private Banks; 
NBFIs: Non-Bank Financial Institutions; SFBs: Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks; SOBs: State-Owned Banks. 
2.2. Banks’ minimum reserves 
Minimum liquidity requirements imposed by the BCRA affect crucially the interbank money 
market, both directly and indirectly. In Argentina, they are defined according to the deposits of 
each entity, with different requirements depending on their maturity.  
Liquidity reserves are computed as the monthly average of banks’ current account deposits at 
the BCRA. From 2003 to 2017, these requirements averaged 14% of total deposits, varying 
between 11% and 17% (considering all kinds of domestic currency deposits). At the end of each 
month, the monthly average of banks’ current account balances at the BCRA must exceed these 
minimum levels to avoid financial penalties. Additionally, since 1997, a mandatory daily liquidity 
minimum has also been established, defined as a proportion of the monthly requirement (most of 
the time it was 50%). These regulations impact substantially on the interbank markets, since 
financial entities tend precisely to resort to these markets to adjust their liquidity excesses or 
shortages, always considering the constraints imposed by the monetary authority. 
3. Network theory and empirical interbank markets 
Over the last decade, academic researchers as well as policy-makers have devoted a good deal 
of attention to issues associated with financial system’s interconnectedness and its implications in 
terms of stability and vulnerability [8]. There is no clear consensus on whether a completely 
interconnected financial network reduces contagion and domino effects [9, 10] or fuels them [11]. 
Interconnectedness among banks improves risk diversification, but at the same time it makes them 
more prone to contagion. In any case, from a financial stability perspective, there is broad 
agreement on the idea that banks should neither be too-big-to-fail nor too-interconnected-to-fail 
[12], as these types of institutions entail a potential source of vulnerability for the whole system. 
Boss et al [13], for Austria, and Inaoka et al [14], for Japan, carried out the first topological 
analyses of real interbank networks comparable to the one proposed in this paper. Thereafter, 
several pieces of research have been developed in this line. The Appendix summarizes the main 
results of 27 empirical studies on financial networks of 18 countries (including the topological 
measures computed here for Argentina), in order to have benchmark metrics for our findings. 
Overall, real-world interbank networks are sparse, which means that they are far from 
complete. In almost all empirical cases the average reciprocity is higher than the density of the 
network, so the connections tend to be more reciprocal than in random graphs [15]. This fact 
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denotes that financial institutions prefer to interact with those agents with whom they have already 
established relationships in the past. Hence the relevance of taking into consideration the presence 
of stable interconnections when assessing and modelling the behavior of financial entities.  
Furthermore, interbank networks exhibit higher clustering coefficients than random graphs of 
equal size, but substantially lower than regular networks. They also display, in general, short 
distances (between 1.5 and 4, on average). Absolutely all the pieces of research reviewed conclude 
that interbank networks show disassortative mixing, which means that nodes with many edges tend 
to be connected to nodes with relatively less links, and vice versa.  
There is consensus that financial networks follow heavy-tailed distributions. Many studies 
ascertain that degree distributions fit reasonably well to a Power Law (with an exponent between 
2 and 3.5), which means that these networks can be described as scale-free [16]. Consequently, it 
is usual to find few banks with an extraordinarily high number of edges, coupled with a myriad of 
nodes far less interconnected. The number of agents in financial networks tends to be relatively 
low (much smaller, for example, than in biological or social networks), a fact that hampers 
significantly the statistical analysis of their degree distributions. 
Depending on the specific type of data analyzed, three subgroups of financial networks can 
be clearly identified across literature: 1) balance sheet exposures; 2) payments; and 3) transactions 
in the interbank money markets. This paper is focused on the latter. This kind of networks are 
usually smaller than payment networks and are, on average, the sparsest among the three 
subgroups. In addition, they exhibit significantly lower clustering coefficients than payment 
systems, given that in general their values do not exceed 0.2, while in the second case the average 
clustering is around 0.5. The networks based on balance sheet exposures also show clustering 
coefficients slightly smaller than payment systems. 
4. Data 
The BCRA stores daily data about all the transactions carried out in the call market. The 
information available includes the lender and the borrower entities, the amount of money, the loan 
maturity, the currency involved, the agreed interest rate and the type of rate (fixed or variable). 
Our sample consists of 314,188 loan operations, conducted between 2 January 2003 and 29 
December 2017, by 99 different entities (12 SOBs, 41 DPBs, 27 SFBs and 19 NBFIs). 99.3% of 
the transactions were settled in Argentine pesos and 88.8% were overnight. With the aim of getting 
comparable results to those of other empirical studies on financial networks over the world, the 
sample is restricted to consider only the overnight loans in pesos with fixed interest rate. This 
subset comprises 278,497 operations (88.6% of the entire dataset).  
For the construction of weighted networks, all the weights involved are based on amounts of 
money expressed in millions of constant pesos of 2017, that is, in real terms (constant purchasing 
power)1. The data on total deposits, assets and liquidity of financial institutions (used in the 
regressions of Section 7) emerge from information collected by the BCRA. 
5. Notation and methods 
Since the minimum liquidity requirement established by the BCRA for banks is based on the 
average amount of reserves over a whole month, the monthly networks appear to be a better 
approximation than the daily networks to grasp the genuine lattice of relationships among banks 
emerging from their liquidity management. This approach can also be understood noting that all 
the transactions in the call market are based on the previous existence of open credit lines among 
 
1 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) was obtained from different sources: a) January 2003 to November 2006 and 
May 2016 to December 2017: INDEC; b) December 2006 to April 2011: average of provinces’ CPIs; c) May 
2011 to July 2012: National Congress; d) August 2012 to April 2016: City of Buenos Aires’ CPI. 
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banks, which set up a “latent” network of interrelationships. Every day, some links “activate” and 
others do not, but they remain available in case of need. 
5.1. Topological indicators: size and connectivity 
To analyze the call market as a network, each node represents a bank that carried out at least one 
transaction in the month, while edges are created when at least one operation was settled between 
a pair of entities during such lapse. A directed network is then defined by this set of nodes (N) and 
edges (M). The components (𝑎𝑖𝑗) of its Adjacency Matrix (a 𝑁 𝑁 matrix denoted by A) are 1 if 
|𝑤𝑖𝑗| > 0 and 0 otherwise, where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the average amount of money loaned to the bank 𝑗 by the 
bank 𝑖 in the month. Therefore, a link is incoming to the borrower and outgoing from the lender. 
The distance (𝑑𝑖𝑗) between two nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 is defined as the number of edges along the 
shortest path connecting them. The longest distance in the network is called “diameter”. The 
density or “degree of completeness” (δ) of a network quantifies the percentage of the potential 
links that actually exist, given the number of nodes in the graph. It is computed as follows: 𝛿 =
(∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑗 )/(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)).  
It is often relevant to know if edges are reciprocal, i.e., to find out to what extent the links that 
go from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗 are also directed in the opposite way. The standard measure of 
“reciprocity” (𝑅) is the following: 𝑅 =  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑎𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗 /𝑀. However, this indicator does not take into 
account that denser networks tend to have a higher number of reciprocal links, due exclusively to 
random reasons [17]. To address this issue, 𝑅 can be adjusted for the density of the network: 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝛿)/(1 − 𝛿). Values of 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗 above (below) zero imply a larger (lower) reciprocity 
than a random network with the same density. 
The “degree” of a node 𝑖 (𝑘𝑖) reflects the number of nodes with which it is connected. In the 
case of directed graphs, the in-degree (𝑘𝑖
𝑖𝑛) is the number of nodes with which node 𝑖 has incoming 
edges, while the out-degree (𝑘𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡) quantifies the node 𝑖’s outgoing links. Similarly, the node 
strength (𝑠𝑖) is the sum of the weights (𝑤𝑖𝑗 and 𝑤𝑗𝑖) of all the edges of a node; that is, the sum of 
the money involved in all the links of a given vertex 𝑖. It is convenient to assess in a different way 
the relevance of the entities that operate large liquidity flows per month, with respect to the entities 
that may be connected to many others (i.e., display a high degree) but through low-value 
operations. The nodes’ in-strength (𝑠𝑖
𝑖𝑛) and out-strength (𝑠𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡) will be analogously computed, but 
weighting the edges only by the funds borrowed or loaned, respectively. 
The assortativity of the nodes (𝜌𝑘𝑗) reflects their preference between the option of being 
connected with others of a similar degree to themselves or relating to a greater extent with those 
that exhibit a different degree. Many ways to compute this metric were developed, but we use the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between the degrees of nodes that share links, in line with Newman 
[18]. Consequently, 𝜌𝑘𝑗 ranges from -1 to 1. If it is positive, the network is said to show an 
assortative behavior (also called “homophily”), meaning that the nodes tend to be connected to 
others of a similar degree. If it is negative, the network is “disassortative”, implying that low-
degree nodes tend to be attached to high-degree nodes and vice versa. Disassortative networks are 
particularly vulnerable to targeted attacks on their highest-degree vertices, while assortative 
networks proved to be more resilient to them [18]. 
The clustering coefficient of node 𝑖 is defined as follows: 𝑐𝑖 =
1
𝑘𝑖(𝑘𝑖−1)/2
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑎𝑗ℎ𝑗,ℎ . It is a 
measure of the probability that two nodes which are neighbors of a same node also share a link 
themselves. A high clustering reveals the existence of stable relationships among the nodes, with 
all the potential consequences that it entails, which can be either positive (e.g., an enhanced 
resilience to random shocks) or negative (e.g., higher level of contagion when other banks fail). 
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5.2. Centrality and concentration 
Centrality measures are key to detect too-interconnected-to-fail vertices, and consequently to 
estimate the potential vulnerability of a network. Several metrics have been developed, based on 
different approaches. Degree Centrality (𝑘𝑖) is one of the most basic ones. According to it, a node 
is more relevant if it has a higher degree. If a bank is connected to many others, its failure could 
impact on them directly. For some specific purposes, it is important to examine the nodes’ out-
degree (𝑘𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡) and in-degree centrality (𝑘𝑖
𝑖𝑛). Similarly, the Strength Centrality can be analogously 
interpreted, either considering the banks’ total strength (𝑠𝑖), in-strength (𝑠𝑖
𝑖𝑛) or out-strength (𝑠𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡). 
The Closeness Centrality (CC) of a node is based on how many intermediaries are required to 
pass through in order to reach it. This measure is associated with the capability of a node to spread 
contagion, and it is calculated as follows: 𝐶𝐶(𝑖) = (𝑁 − 1)/(∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗 ). In contrast, Betweenness 
Centrality is related to the strategic location of a node on the network’s communications paths. In 
the case of the call market, this type of centrality reflects the influence of a node on the liquidity 
channels within the system. Betweenness Centrality reveals how fast potential shocks can spread 
through the network, while other measures, like degree or closeness centrality, account for the 
probability of amplification of shocks to the neighbors of each vertex [19]. The Betweenness 
Centrality (B) of a node 𝑖 is defined as: 𝐵(𝑖) = ∑ [(𝜎𝑗ℎ(𝑖)) 𝜎𝑗ℎ⁄ ]𝑖≠𝑗≠ℎ∈𝑁 , where 𝜎𝑗ℎ is the number 
of shortest paths between 𝑗 and ℎ, and 𝜎𝑗ℎ(𝑖) is the number of shortest paths between 𝑗 and ℎ that 
pass through node 𝑖. Dividing 𝐵(𝑖) by (N-1)*(N-2), the measure is normalized, so that it can be 
applied homogeneously to graphs of different sizes. 
The last centrality measure examined is the Eigenvector Centrality, proposed by Bonacich 
[20]. As its name suggests, the centrality value of node 𝑖 is given by the 𝑖th entry of the eigenvector 
(e) associated to the largest eigenvalue (λ) of the graph’s adjacency matrix (A). This measure takes 
into consideration the centrality of a node’s neighbors to compute its own centrality. It can be 
understood as the weighted sum of the direct and indirect connections of the node, at any length.  
All these measures are defined in such a way that a higher value is always interpreted as a 
larger centrality of a node in the network. Based on these metrics, Section 7 assesses the effect of 
a higher centrality on the banks’ capability to agree more convenient interest rates in the call 
market. To this purpose, an econometric regression is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
including control variables to remove potential sources of endogeneity (in line with the procedure 
applied by [6]). The robustness of the resulting coefficients is tested by examining alternative 
specifications (computing heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors). All the daily transactions are 
considered individually for these exercises (not their monthly averages). Comparable studies were 
carried out on the Fed Funds Market in U.S.A. [6], and the interbank markets of Norway [21], 
Switzerland [22] and Germany [23]. All these contributions verified the existence of a positive 
effect derived from a higher centrality on the ability to agree better interest rates in money markets. 
However, it is worth noting that all those studies are based on developed financial systems. 
The centrality analysis is complemented by an assessment of the concentration of liquidity 
flows. The typical Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices are computed to measure the concentration in 
the lenders’ side of the market -HHI(L)- and among the borrowers -HHI(B)-: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝐿) =∑(
𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑉
)
2
𝑖
 ;  𝐻𝐻𝐼(𝐵) =∑(
𝑣𝑗𝑖
𝑉
)
2
𝑖
 
𝑣𝑖𝑗 and 𝑣𝑗𝑖 denote, respectively, the total amount of money loaned and borrowed by each entity 
𝑖 in a specific month (expressed in real terms). 𝑉 refers to the total traded volume in the network 
(𝑉 = ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑖 = ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑖𝑖 ). The HHI is often used to measure market power. It ranges from 0 to 1. A 
higher value indicates a greater concentration of liquidity among few participants. To obtain 
comparable measures across time and different network sizes, this index is normalized by adjusting 
it according to the changes in N: 𝐻𝐻𝐼∗ = ((𝐻𝐻𝐼 − 1/𝑁))/(1 − 1/𝑁). 
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5.3. Degree distribution 
In random graphs, most of the nodes have a similar degree, near to the average. But real networks 
hardly ever show this property [16]. In many contexts their degree distributions follow a Power 
Law, in which case they are called scale-free networks. Mathematically, a quantity 𝑘 obeys a 
Power Law if it is drawn from a Probability Density Function (PDF) as follows: 𝑃(𝑘) ∝ 𝑘−𝛼, 
where 𝛼 is a constant parameter. One remarkable feature of this distribution is that it frequently 
originates extreme values very far from the mean, exhibiting heavier tails than Poisson, normal or 
exponential distributions. This gives rise to networks in which few highly interconnected nodes 
coexist with many low-connected nodes. 
Scale-free networks are robust-yet-fragile structures [24]. They exhibit a surprising degree of 
tolerance against random removals of a relatively large number of nodes (robustness). However, 
this error tolerance is coupled with a high susceptibility to targeted attacks. These networks break 
rapidly into isolated fragments when a few of the most connected nodes fail (vulnerability). This 
attribute has critical implications in terms of systemic fragility of interbank networks. If a financial 
network displays this behavior, then a rigorous identification of the main agents becomes a priority 
task for central banks and regulators. Instead, random graphs show the converse risk structure. 
They easily absorb targeted attacks but tend to fall apart swiftly when random failures occur.  
Thus, one objective of this paper is to verify if the empirical degree distributions of the 
monthly networks behave like random graphs (which are best described by a Poisson), or if the 
empirical data fits better to a “heavy-tailed” distribution, such as, for example, a Power Law or 
Lognormal. In the latter case, “unusual” or disruptive events exhibit a relatively higher probability 
than in the random contexts, a fact with significant implications in terms of systemic risk. 
The methodology proposed by Clauset, Shalizi and Newman [25] is applied to this purpose, 
as it has proven to achieve more robust results than the other existing techniques. It is often the 
case that degree distributions follow a Power Law only in the tail, i.e., for values above a certain 
lower bound (𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛). Hence, an unbiased selection of 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 constitutes a crucial prerequisite to 
estimate the other parameters of the fitted distributions, which are in turn estimated by the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. Clauset et al [25] suggest choosing the value of 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 that 
minimizes the differences between the distribution of the empirical data and the best-fit theoretical 
model (regardless of the model selected). For non-normal data, the most usual method to measure 
the distance between two probability distributions is the Kolmogórov-Smirnov (KS) statistic: 
𝐾𝑆 = max
𝑥≥𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
|𝐷(𝑥) − 𝑃(𝑥)| , 
where 𝐷(𝑥) is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the data, for values above 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛, 
and 𝑃(𝑥) is the CDF of the hypothetical model fitted by ML, for the same region 𝑥  𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛. The 
proposed estimate of 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 is then the value that minimizes KS. The variances of the parameter 
estimates (both for 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 and the others) are computed by the non-parametric bootstrap method.  
However, once the parameters of a specific distribution are estimated to fit the data, it is also 
necessary to analyze whether that distribution represents a plausible description of the data or not. 
To this purpose, Clauset et al [25] suggest a goodness-of-fit test which generates a p-value that 
measures the plausibility of the hypothetical model. In this test, the “distance” (the KS statistic) 
between the distribution of the empirical data and the hypothesized model is compared with 
distance measurements for, say, 3,000 synthetic datasets generated from the same proposed 
theoretical model (i.e., 3,000 synthetic KS statistics). A p-value is then defined as the fraction of 
the synthetic distances that are larger than our original KS. If this p-value is sufficiently large, the 
hypothesized distribution would represent a plausible fit to the data. The authors choose a p-value 
 0.1 as threshold for rejection, but they also suggest a less stringent rule of p-value  0.05. 
Finally, the performance of the different proposed models is then assessed by comparing the 
log-likelihood levels associated to each fitted distribution, based on the empirical data and the 
parameter estimates. For instance, if the log-likelihood resulting from the Lognormal fit is higher 
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than the one derived from the other proposed distributions, that would indicate that the Lognormal 
describes better the data set (even in the possible case that none of the hypothesized distributions 
was rejected by the goodness-of-fit test described in the previous paragraph). 
A note of caution is in order. Scale-free properties tend to emerge in large graphs, but financial 
networks are usually relatively small (compared to social or biological ones, for example). This 
fact can bias the process of fitting a set of observations to a theoretical distribution [25]. For this 
reason, many recent empirical studies focused on the less ambitious task of detecting “heavy-tailed 
behaviors”, testing fits with several fat-tailed distributions and not only Power Laws [26]. 
6. Network analysis of the overnight money market 
6.1. Size and connectivity 
The Argentine interbank network is relatively small (Fig. 3). However, this characteristic is 
shared by overnight loans networks in general, as they tend to be tinier than graphs based on 
balance sheet exposures or payments. If we circumscribe only to loans networks, the Argentine is 
not the smallest (cf. the Appendix), but it is substantially tinier than other developed markets, for 
instance, the Fed Funds network in the U.S.A. [6] or the Italian Overnight Money Market [26]. 
 
Fig. 3. Argentine interbank networks (monthly average). Each node represents a financial entity (green: 
SOBs; red: DPBs; light blue: SFBs; dark blue: NBFIs). Each edge denotes the existence of at least one loan 
settled between a pair of entities during the month, and its color is defined by the lender entity. The 
visualization layout was computed by the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm. 
 
From 2003 to 2017, the monthly networks had an average of 65±6 nodes and 237.5±73 edges 
(considering the directed graphs). These two variables underwent large fluctuations, mainly 
between 2003 and 2011 (Fig. 4A). Stage 1 is the most volatile period, when the financial system 
was still recovering from the 2001 crisis and the debt default was not solved yet. The interbank 
network started to grow considerably in 2004. The percentage of active banks in the call market 
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with respect to the total number of entities in the system increased from 55% in 2003 to an average 
of 84.5% in 2007, and then stabilized at around 81.5% during the rest of the period (Fig. 4B). 
The number of nodes and links reached peaks in 2007, during Stage 2. When the 2008 global 
crisis broke out, the networks suffered a sizable contraction. The graphs remained shrunk until the 
beginnings of 2010. Then, they started to grow again until 2011, when they got to the levels at 
which they would then stabilize until 2017, at around 66 nodes and 243 edges. Since 2011, the 
network showed substantial stability (in line with the country’s economic stagnation during the 
same period), only paused by a transitory decline in early 2012, in a recessive context, after the 
introduction of severe FX controls that hindered the normal functioning of the financial system. 
Nodes and edges tended to move together. In fact, from a log-log regression it is inferred that 
M α N3.45, which implies that the average degree of the network -〈𝑘〉- increases with order N2.45 
(Fig. 4C)2. This result contrasts with theoretical papers that assume that 〈𝑘〉 remains fixed over 
time [27]. This log-log relationship was found in almost every time stage, with the peculiarity that 
during the 2008 crisis the intercept seems to lie in a lower value than the average. 
 
 
Fig. 4. (A) Active nodes and edges in the call market (monthly average). The red circles signal the networks 
shown in Fig. 3. A specific month of each stage was selected in order to display an introductory visual 
approximation of the network’s structural changes throughout the period under analysis. (B) Active nodes in the 
call market (as percentage of total entities in the financial system). (C) Log-Log relationship between N and M. 
The horizontal axis depicts the logarithm of the number of nodes in each monthly network. The vertical axis 
shows the logarithm of the number of edges. (D) Average distance and diameter of monthly networks. 
 
The average distance was 2.8±0.5, while the diameter oscillated around 7.9±1.9. These two 
metrics had proportional trajectories and roughly co-moved with the number of active nodes and 
edges (Fig. 4D). The average distance generally remained stable between 2 and 3, with few 
exceptions, in line with the typical range displayed by financial networks over the world (c.f. the 
Appendix). The diameter followed a similar path, though it was substantially more volatile. 
 
2 This M-N elasticity is significantly higher than the one found in the Italian overnight market (M α N1.5) [26]. 
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Overnight loans networks usually exhibit low density [12] in comparison with networks 
studied in other sciences (e.g., biology, physics, social networks). The Argentine interbank market 
is not the exception, since only 5.5%±1.1% of the potential edges actually exists. The monthly 
networks’ density behaved similarly to the other topological measures already described (Fig. 5A). 
The reciprocity coefficient was on average 7.9%±3% and exceeded the level of density in 77.2% 
of the months. These values are in line with other real-world interbank networks, although the 
Argentine figures are among the lowest. The reciprocity experienced significant volatility, hitting 
a maximum of 17.7% in September 2011 and a minimum of 1.8% in early 2010. 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗 stood at 
2.5%±3.1%, implying that the network tends to show higher reciprocity than a random graph of 
equal degree of completeness. This means that banks are prone to establish two-way links between 
each other for non-random reasons, highlighting the importance of accounting for the existence of 
steady relationships within the call market (at least when evaluating its systemic stability). 
 
 
Fig. 5. (A) Density and reciprocity of monthly networks. (B) Assortativity coefficient, according to the 
maturity of the loans considered. (C) Clustering coefficient. The observed average clustering coefficient in 
the empirical networks is compared with the clustering coefficient that would emerge from a random graph 
with the same number of nodes (N) and with the same average degree 〈k〉. The average clustering coefficient 
of a random network is equal to: 〈𝑘〉/𝑁. (D) Relative clustering coefficient. 
 
The assortativity coefficient averaged -16.3%±9.4% (Fig. 5B), which means that the network 
is disassortative. Low-degree banks are more likely to interact with high-degree banks than with 
other low-degree ones. It is the typical behavior found in all the other financial networks over the 
world. This disassortative mixing intensified during the first booming years (2003-07). The 
assortativity coefficients were negative in the 94% of monthly networks. Only in 10 months (out 
of the 180 analyzed) the market displayed a sporadic assortative behavior, which arose mainly 
when the reciprocity hit maximums, in 2011-12. However, when all the loan maturities are 
considered (i.e., not only overnight), networks remain always disassortative. This fact reinforces 
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the idea that high-degree entities tend to create more links with low-degree ones, but it additionally 
suggests that the transactions settled with low-degree banks frequently have longer maturities. 
The call market exhibited clustering coefficients systematically above those of a comparable 
random graph throughout the period, with only one exception in January 2009 (Figs. 5C and 5D). 
The creation of relatively stable (non-random) clusters is a usual practice in financial networks, 
due to the propensity to establish lasting relationships among financial agents. This conduct allows 
them to tackle problems related to moral hazard and adverse selection. Nevertheless, at the same 
time the need of risk diversification puts an upper limit to clustering levels. This trade-off explains 
why clustering coefficient in interbank networks tends not to reach comparatively high values in 
relation with other real-world networks (e.g., biological or linguistic networks). In broad terms, 
the Argentine case follows these guidelines, with an average clustering of 19%±5.1%. 
In summary, the call market’s main topological measures experienced a significant volatility, 
mostly between 2003 and 2010. Starting from very low levels in 2003, the number of nodes and 
edges, the diameter, average distance, density and reciprocity of the network grew altogether in 
simultaneous with the GDP until 2007. During this expansion, disassortativity increased, as also 
did the clustering coefficient. The global crisis triggered a strong contraction in all these metrics, 
and banks’ reciprocity and clustering tended towards those of a random network. In 2010-11 the 
indicators rebounded sharply, with the peculiarity that reciprocity hit historical peaks along with 
transitorily positive assortativity coefficients. This singular behavior distinguishes that recovery 
phase from the previous growth period of 2003-07. In 2011, the topological metrics reached levels 
that would then remain stable on average until 2015. Not many significant changes were witnessed 
in 2016-17, except for an incipient decrease in density and relative clustering coefficient. 
6.2. Centrality and concentration 
Financial entities exhibited an average total degree of 7.1±1.8, which fluctuated proportionally to 
the number of edges. This indicator was clearly heterogeneous among the different types of banks. 
SFBs were the group with the largest average degree since 2003 until the global crisis, after which 
DPBs took over this central role in the market until 2017. Meanwhile, NBFIs were the group with 
the lowest average degree during all the period, playing a more peripheral role. 
The different types of entities assumed contrasting positions in the network. SOBs had an 
average out-degree always higher than their in-degree, becoming the prime liquidity providers of 
the market. These banks held the highest average out-degree of the network between 2004 and 
2008, the most buoyant years in terms of the market’s activity. DPBs were important liquidity 
providers too, essentially between 2012 and 2017. In the opposite side, SFBs were the main 
borrowers, displaying the largest average in-degree almost throughout the period. NBFIs showed, 
in general, a higher average out-degree than in-degree, except in the last stage (Figs. 6A and 6B). 
From the perspective of the node strength (Figs. 6C and 6D), conclusions do not differ 
significantly, but some peculiarities deserve to be highlighted. During the most dynamic moments 
of the network, between 2005 and 2007, the main players of the market were fundamentally the 
SOBs, as lenders, and the SFBs, as borrowers. DPBs also performed a key role in both sides of the 
market (but with less predominance), while NBFIs displayed a substantially higher out-strength 
than in-strength. With the outbreak of the global crisis, the average node strength of the system 
collapsed, from ARS 917±140 million to nearly 260±43 million in 2009. SOBs were the group of 
banks which suffered the sharpest decline. Since then, no group consolidated as the most central 
from the out-strength perspective. Even though since 2010 the average node strength recovered to 
ARS 370±60 million and remained around those levels until 2017, no group emerged as the most 
central liquidity provider in the market. In terms of in-strength, SFBs stood as the main borrowers 
almost every month. They also experienced a decay during the crisis, but nonetheless they bounced 
back relatively fast and kept their hegemonic role in the following years. 
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Fig. 6. (A) Average out-degree. (B) Average in-degree. (C) Average out-strength. (D) Average in-strength. 
The four figures show the monthly average values for each subgroup of entities. Node strength is expressed 
in ARS million (constant prices of 2017). 
 
The network was more concentrated between 2003 and 2009 than in the succeeding years, 
more markedly in the case of borrowers -HHI*(B)- than lenders -HHI*(L)- (Fig. 7A). This result 
is consistent with the node strength’s evolution. Both HHIs fell (i.e., the market reduced its 
concentration levels) over the years. Starting from about 10% on average in 2003-04, after the 
global crisis those indices plateaued until 2017, around 4.6% for lenders and 4.8% for borrowers. 
 
 
Fig. 7. (A) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), adjusted by N. (B) Distribution of entities according to their 
monthly net liquidity positions in the market (as percentage of total active nodes in monthly networks). 
 
Another approach to study the network’s concentration is based on the analysis of the “net 
liquidity positions” of the entities in the market. These positions result from netting out all the 
gross flows traded by each entity during a month. That procedure allows us to elucidate how many 
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banks were net lenders (i.e., provide liquidity to the system) and how many were net borrowers in 
the market (i.e., absorb liquidity from it). In 91% of the months analyzed there were more net 
lenders than net borrowers (Fig. 7B), which reflects that the former group was less concentrated 
than the latter. Nevertheless, the number of net lenders never exceeded 67.5% of total entities, 
implying that the distribution of liquidity suppliers and demanders was never substantially skewed. 
6.3. Degree distribution 
From a first exploration of the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs) 
of nodes’ total degrees, in-degrees and out-degrees (Fig. 8), it can be inferred that they show 
“heavier” tails than a Poisson. Lognormal distribution appears to be the best fit to most of the 
observations. However, in the case of out-degrees the evidence also provides some support to the 
hypothesis of a Power Law behavior in the tail of their distribution. This preliminary approach 
indicates that there is a large number of banks with few links, coexisting with a small number of 
highly interconnected entities, which are key to the well-functioning of the network. 
 
 
Fig. 8. CCDFs of nodes’ degrees, corresponding to the network of December 2016. This month was chosen 
as a representative example because the topological features of its graph are the most similar to the average 
of monthly networks over the whole period (67 nodes, 258 edges). Axis are in log-scale. 
 
After applying the methodology introduced by Clauset et al [25] to define if the lognormal 
distribution fits statistically to the monthly empirical networks (and having therefore estimated 
one p-value per monthly network), it results that in 90% of the cases the null hypothesis of 
lognormal fit is not rejected for the total degree distribution, considering a type 1 error probability 
of 10%. Reducing this threshold to 5%, the null hypothesis is not rejected in 95% of the months. 
Those levels of non-rejection are 88.3% and 92.8%, respectively, for the in-degree distribution, 
and 91.1% and 95.6% in the case of out-degrees (Table 2). Thus, in almost every month the null 
hypothesis of lognormal fit is held true, more strongly in the case of the out-degree distribution.  
The estimates of 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 turned out to be low, which means that the number of observations 
removed to carry out the estimation of the other parameters is relatively small (compared to the 
total range of the variable). In fact, the minimum cut-off in the case of total degrees is 4.4 on 
average (versus maximum of 36 degrees), 3.2 for in-degrees (versus a maximum of 27), and 2.7 
for out-degrees (versus a maximum of 23). It is important to highlight again that these are relatively 
small networks compared to the ones analyzed by other sciences (e.g., biology, physics, linguistics, 
social networks, etc., where nodes and edges can easily reach thousands or even millions).  
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Table 2. Percentage of monthly networks with a degree distribution that does not reject the 
lognormal hypothesis 
 
 
The parameter estimates for the fitted distributions can be found in Table 3. When contrasted 
with other empirical distributions that can be fitted by a Lognormal [28], these parameters are in 
line with those found in the context of social sciences, economics, linguistics, medicine or geology.  
 
Table 3. Estimates of Lognormal parameters for the monthly networks’ degree distributions 
 
Note: Table 3 shows the average value of the parameter estimates in each Stage, based on the monthly estimates. 
 
To the purpose of comparing the Lognormal goodness-of-fit with that of other distributions 
usually studied in specialized literature, the log-likelihood derived from the Lognormal hypothesis 
is contrasted with the resulting log-likelihood of a Poisson and a Power Law, both fitted to the data 
using an analogous methodology. Applying the same optimal 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 that emerges from a Power-
Law fit to compute both log-likelihoods, in the 98.3% of cases the log-likelihood derived from the 
Lognormal fit to the total degree distributions is higher than the one derived from a Power Law. 
This result also arises in the 99.4% of monthly in-degree distributions and in the 100% of monthly 
out-degree distributions. From the same procedure, it is concluded that the Lognormal describes 
better the data than a Poisson in the 96.7% of months in the case of total degree distributions, in 
the 96.1% of in-degree distributions and in the 97.2% of out-degree distributions.  
In sum, the Lognormal distribution, with the parameters shown in Table 3, is the one that best 
fits to the empirical data, with just a few exceptions. After a detailed examination of these 
exceptions, no clear regularities emerge that could systematically explain the rejections to the 
Lognormal hypothesis. They are not concentrated in any of the time stages and those exceptional 
networks do not show any peculiar topological feature. This heavy-tailed distribution seems to be 
the most suitable to describe the histogram of total degrees, as well as in- and out-degrees, a 
phenomenon that has critical implications when assessing the probability of disruptive events and 
financial fragility, which are key inputs for the design of macroprudential and banking regulation. 
p-value > 
0.1
p-value > 
0.05
Average 
Xmin
p-value > 
0.1
p-value > 
0.05
Average 
Xmin
p-value > 
0.1
p-value > 
0.05
Average 
Xmin
1 Jan-03 - Jun-05 90.0% 93.3% 2.9 93.3% 93.3% 2.7 93.3% 100.0% 2.0
2 Jul-05 - Dec-07 90.0% 93.3% 6.3 96.7% 96.7% 2.7 93.3% 93.3% 4.3
3 Jan-08 - Feb-10 92.3% 92.3% 3.1 88.5% 88.5% 2.7 88.5% 88.5% 1.5
4 Mar-10 - Oct-11 90.0% 100.0% 3.6 80.0% 90.0% 3.9 85.0% 90.0% 2.9
5 Nov-11 - Nov-15 89.8% 98.0% 4.5 85.7% 91.8% 4.0 89.8% 95.9% 2.9
6 Dec-15 - Dec-17 88.0% 92.0% 5.0 84.0% 88.0% 3.4 96.0% 100.0% 2.4
90.0% 95.0% 4.4 88.3% 92.8% 3.2 91.1% 95.6% 2.7Jan-03 - Dec-17
Out-degreeIn-degreeTotal degree
DateStage
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1 Jan-03 - Jun-05 1.6 0.7 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.8
2 Jul-05 - Dec-07 2.3 0.6 1.9 0.8 1.7 0.6
3 Jan-08 - Feb-10 1.7 0.6 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.7
4 Mar-10 - Oct-11 1.8 0.6 1.7 0.6 1.3 0.6
5 Nov-11 - Nov-15 2.1 0.6 1.8 0.7 1.4 0.7
6 Dec-15 - Dec-17 2.0 0.6 1.8 0.6 1.3 0.7
1.9 0.6 1.7 0.7 1.3 0.7Jan-03 - Dec-17
Total degree In-degree Out-degree
Stage Date
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7. Effects of node centrality on bilateral interest rates 
A set of regressions were computed with the aim of measuring the potential effects derived 
from node centrality on the bilateral interest rates that banks are able to settle in the call market. 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the interest rate differential between the bilateral rate 
agreed in each operation and the average market rate in the same day. Formally, the objective is 
to estimate the impact of node 𝑖’s centrality (measured by different indicators) on:   
(6.1)                                              𝑟 =  
𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡
𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡
, 
where 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the interest rate agreed between entity 𝑖 and entity 𝑗 on day 𝑡, and 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡 is 
the average interest rate of all the transactions in the market on day 𝑡. This specific definition of 
the dependent variable (as a percentage of the market rate, and not in basis points) is useful to 
avoid biases derived from the substantial volatility experienced by the call rate. On that basis, nine 
different regressions were carried out using the following generic form:  
(6.2)     𝑟 =  𝛼 + 𝛽11(𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 > 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) +
𝛽21(𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 > 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) + 𝛾1𝐷𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛾3𝑋 
𝛽1 is the coefficient that quantifies the effect of centrality on 𝑟. 𝛽2 measures the impact derived 
from the fact that the lender has a bigger size than its counterparty (in terms of assets or deposits). 
These two effects are estimated by the inclusion of binary variables which take the value 1 when 
the lender is more central that the borrower (in the case of the variable associated to 𝛽1), or when 
the former has a bigger balance sheet than the latter (in the case of 𝛽2), and take the value 0 
otherwise. 𝐷𝑖 are vectors of dummies included to take into account the type of entities involved in 
the transaction (in order to control for the differences that arise when SOBs, DPBs, SFBs and/or 
NBFIs are involved in the transaction). 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are the vectors of coefficients associated to this 
set of dummies. 𝑋 stands for a vector of control variables related to the conditions of the loan, such 
as the amount of money (in real terms), maturity in calendar days (as all the loans considered have 
a maturity of 1 working day), etc. 𝛼 is the intercept. 
The resulting estimates based on the generic form (6.2) are shown in Table 4. Considering 
any of the five centrality measures individually (columns 1-5), in all cases their associated 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant. This implies that a lender that is more central 
in the network than its counterparty (defining this concept by any of the measures discussed) can 
negotiate, on average, higher interest rates than the market rate. The most prominent effect is 
derived from a higher degree centrality (column 1), in which case the lender is able to charge 
interest rates 1.32% above the average call rate. A similar effect, though slightly lower, is caused 
by strength centrality: it allows the entities to lend at rates 1.11% above the market average 
(column 5). The other three metrics (closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality) appear to 
be less effective, with an impact of nearly half of the other two measures. In any case, they show 
positive impacts too, which are statistically and economically significant (columns 2, 3 and 4).  
Regarding the type of entity, DPBs are those who lend funds at the highest interest rates, while 
NBFIs, on average, lend money at the lowest rates. On the borrowers’ side, NBFIs tend to obtain 
the most expensive loans, followed by SOBs in the second place, while SFBs borrow at the most 
convenient rates. All these coefficients are statistically significant, remain stable across the nine 
regressions and their sizes reflect the differences between the businesses that each entity runs. 
On average, a lender with more assets that its counterparty is able to charge interest rates 
between 4% and 4.4% higher than the market rate. This coefficient is stable and significant across 
all specifications, both in statistical and economic terms. If, instead, the size of the entities is 
measured from the other side of their balance sheets, that means, considering their deposits, the 
associated coefficient remains practically unchanged (column 8). Overall, these results are in line 
with those found by similar empirical studies in other countries [3, 21, 23].  
18 
 
Individual liquidity levels also affected bilateral rates. If the lender has higher liquidity levels 
than the borrower, the agreed rate tends to be 0.2%-0.3% lower than the market rate. Besides, none 
of the loan characteristics included as controls had significant impacts on 𝑟 in economic terms. 
 
Table 4. Dependent variable: interest rate differential between bilateral rates and the average 
market rate of the day, as a percentage of the market rate (𝒓) 
 
*Significant with a p-value<0.1. **Significant with a p-value<0.01. Each column shows a set of coefficients estimated 
from a particular specification of (6.2). The 𝑅2 was adjusted according to the number of regressors included. 
 
Specifications 6 to 9 regress 𝑟 on different combinations of centrality measures, to examine 
their partial effects and potential complementarities. The coefficient associated to betweenness 
centrality turns out to be unstable and many times non-significant when included jointly with other 
centrality measures. Something similar occurs in the case of eigenvector centrality. In contrast, 
closeness centrality’s effect remains stable and significant, at around 0.5%, regardless of the 
combination of variables included. Degree and strength centrality proved to be the most relevant 
to explain interest rate differentials. In the first case, its associated coefficient even increases when 
it is included together with other metrics, to a figure near to 1.7%. Strength centrality’s effect 
stands at around 1.1%, also stable and significant even upon changes in the specification. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Centrality Measures
Lender > Borrower, Degree 0.0132** 0.0167** 0.0171**
Lender > Borrower, Closeness  0.0066** 0.0052** 0.0050** 0.0042** 0.0049**
Lender > Borrower, Betweenness 0.0044** -0.0007 -0.0029** -0.0003 0.0001
Lender > Borrower, Eigenvector 0.0069** 0.0052** -0.0053** -0.0080** -0.0011
Lender > Borrower, Strength 0.0111** 0.0107**
Size of financial entity
Lender > Borrower, Assets 0.0409** 0.0441** 0.0441** 0.0430** 0.0398** 0.0431** 0.0412** 0.0411**
Lender > Borrower, Deposits 0.0445**
Lender > Borrower, Liquidity -0.0024** -0.0027** -0.0031** -0.0028** -0.0028** -0.0025** -0.0023** -0.0004 -0.0033**
Type of Lender
State-Owned Bank -0.0135** -0.0129** -0.0127** -0.0133** -0.0138** -0.0132** -0.0134** -0.0150** -0.0127**
Subsidiary of Foreign Bank -0.0279** -0.0267** -0.0277** -0.0273** -0.0281** -0.0267** -0.0274** -0.0269** -0.0306**
Non-Bank Financial Institution -0.0388** -0.0382** -0.0390** -0.0389** -0.0397** -0.0381** -0.0383** -0.0302** -0.0378**
Type of Borrower
Non-Bank Financial Institution 0.1628** 0.1671** 0.1669** 0.1658** 0.1644** 0.1657** 0.1631** 0.1680** 0.1699**
State-Owned Bank 0.0530** 0.0579** 0.0576** 0.0564** 0.0544** 0.0563** 0.0534** 0.0622** 0.0608**
Domestic Private Bank 0.0496** 0.0518** 0.0508** 0.0503** 0.0477** 0.0512** 0.0504** 0.0518** 0.0528**
Loan characteristics
Call rate, market average -0.0017** -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0017** -0.0016** -0.0017** -0.0005** -0.0005**
Maturity 0.000005 0.000008
Amount 0.000005* 0.000005* 0.0000 -0.00001**
Days until end of the month -0.000002 -0.000003 -0.0001* -0.0001*
Time dummies
Monthly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Annual No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Constant -0.0314** -0.0321** -0.0300** -0.0308** -0.0299** -0.0328** -0.0320** -0.0648** -0.0525**
Adjusted R² 0.1668 0.1661 0.1659 0.1661 0.1665 0.1663 0.1670 0.1908 0.1875
Coefficients
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In conclusion, the evidence seems to support the idea that node centrality represents a relevant 
factor at the time of negotiating more convenient rates in the call market. The centrality measures 
with the largest impact are those based on degree and strength, with closeness centrality in the 
second place. These results highlight the importance of the interconnectedness among financial 
entities, not only when examining the system from an aggregate perspective but also when 
approaching the banking business from a micro-level or entrepreneurial point of view. 
8. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyzes for the first time the topological structure of an Argentine interbank 
market. In general, it exhibits a relatively small size (both in terms of nodes and edges), low density 
(as is usual in financial networks) and a reciprocity nearly always higher than a comparable random 
graph. The average distance between banks is lower than 3. The call market is prominently 
disassortative and displays higher clustering coefficients than a random network of the same size. 
The 2008 global crisis produced a significant contraction in all these metrics. During the turmoil, 
banks’ reciprocity and clustering levels tended towards those of comparable random graphs, and 
the network’s disassortative mixing decreased in absolute terms in the years after the event. 
Certain correspondence was detected between the movements in the size of the network and 
the country’s economic activity. Complementarily, it was found that the number of edges reacted 
with a positive and high elasticity to changes in the number of nodes. This finding contradicts 
theoretical models that assume a constant average degree in networks that grow over time.  
Regarding the network’s degree distribution, the evidence consistently supports the 
hypothesis that total degrees, in-degrees and out-degrees distributions fit better to a Lognormal 
than to a Power Law or to a Poisson. The most important implication of this finding is that the 
empirical degree distributions seem to be heavy-tailed, so they would be incorrectly characterized 
by a random graph. This means that a narrow group of highly connected banks coexists with a 
large number of low-degree entities. From a systemic risk perspective, this fact implies that the 
network tends to be “robust-yet-fragile”, in the sense that it is resilient to random failures, but it 
could be very vulnerable when facing directed attacks to the central nodes. This result is crucial 
for the design of macroprudential policies, as it highlights the relevance of a rigorous detection of 
the most central agents, whose failures can potentially disrupt the systemic stability of the market.  
Furthermore, it was found that entities with higher centrality in the network tend to agree more 
convenient bilateral interest rates in their call market operations. Even controlling for the size of 
the entities, their liquidity levels, type of business and the loan conditions, node centrality explains 
a non-trivial effect on the capability to lend at a higher interest rate and borrowing at a lower cost. 
The topological characterization depicted in this paper posits solid empirical foundations to 
carry out theoretical exercises and shock simulations, both for the Argentine network and, in 
general, for analogous markets in similar countries (i.e., middle income countries, with not very 
developed financial systems). The reported results are valuable to assess to what extent the existing 
theoretical models about financial networks, contagion, etc., are applicable to the Argentine 
interbank markets, and therefore to define which are those that best fit to the local dynamics.  
The future research agenda is broad. For instance, a deeper analysis of specific stress events 
of the Argentine history would shed light on potential regularities or stylized facts that might be 
useful to strengthen systemic stability. More research is needed on other domestic networks, such 
as the payment system or the cross-holdings of financial assets by different agents. In this line, the 
study of domestic multilayer networks would be enriching. Complementarily, a dynamic analysis 
of the banks’ trading activity could also provide valuable insights for subsequent theoretical 
modelling (in the vein of studies like [26]). A thorough understanding of the interdependencies 
among financial (and non-financial) agents constitutes a crucial task in a world where distances 
and reaction times are shrinking at a striking pace. 
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9. Appendix: Main topological measures of empirical interbank networks  
 
Country Reference Period Data type Frequency N M
1 Density Reciprocity Clustering
2
Assortativity
3
Average 
Distance
Degree distribution
4
Interbank loans 55 69-83 2.6% - - -0.1375 - Rejects Power law
Other interbank    
money flows
55 784-804 26.9% - - -0.375 - Rejects Power law
Austria Boss et al.  (2004) 2000-2003
Balance sheet 
exposures
Quarterly 883 Max. entropy - - 0.12 ± 0.01 - 2.59 ± 0.02 Power law (α=2.01)
Brazil Cont et al.  (2013) 2007-2008
Balance sheet 
exposures
Irregular 592-597 1,200 - - 0.2 Disassortative 2.35-2.42 Power law (α=2.54)
Canada
Embree & Roberts 
(2009)
2004-2008 Payments Daily 14 - 69.2% ± 3.3% 89.3% ± 2.5% 0.84 ± 0.015 - 1.31 ± 0.03 -
Colombia (a)
Cepeda López 
(2008)
2006 Payments Daily 126 2,245 16.4% 34.2% 0.61 - 2.04
Power law (Out: α=3.06 /     
In: α=3.24)
Colombia (b)
Machado et al. 
(2010)
2006 and 
2009
Payments Daily 125-137 6,843-9,400 42.8%-60.6% - - - 2.04-2.17 -
Interbank money 
market transactions
43.6 ± 4.1 75 ± 23 11.2% ± 5.8% 26.2% ± 5.5% 0.2 ± 0.1 - 2.9 ± 0.4 Exponential
Payments 89 ± 5.3 283 ± 41 8.3% ± 0.8% 22.8% ± 1.8% 0.5 ± 0.1 - 2.5 ± 0.1 Negative binomial
Estonia
Rendón de la Torre 
et al. (2016)
2014 Payments Yearly 16,613 43,375 13% - 0.183 -0.18 7.1 Power law (α=2.45)
EU Alves et al.  (2013) 2011
Balance sheet 
exposures
Yearly 54 1,737 60% 71% 0.84 -0.24 1.38 Power law (α=3.5)
Germany
Craig & von Peter 
(2014)
1999-2012
Balance sheet 
exposures
Quarterly 1,732 ± 85 20,081 ± 1,461 0.66% - - - - Rejects Poisson
Hungary Lublóy (2006) 2005 Payments Monthly 36 774 61% - - - - -
Australia
Sokolov et al. 
(2012)
2007 Daily
Denmark
Rørdam & Bech 
(2009)
2006 Daily
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Country Reference Period Data type Frequency N M
1 Density Reciprocity Clustering
2
Assortativity
3
Average 
Distance
Degree distribution
4
Italy (a)
De Masi et al. 
(2006)
1999-2002
Interbank money 
market transactions 
(e-MID)
Daily 140 200 - - - Power law (α=2.3)
Italy (b) Iori et al.  (2008) 1999-2002
Interbank money 
market transactions 
(e-MID)
Daily 177-215 - - - - Disassortative -
Not scale-free, but heavier-
tailed than a random network
Italy (c) Fricke & Lux (2014) 1999-2010
Interbank money 
market transactions 
(e-MID)
Quarterly 120-200 - 17%-25% - - Disassortative - -
Italy (d) Fricke & Lux (2015) 1999-2010
Interbank money 
market transactions 
(e-MID)
Daily and 
Quarterly
- - - - - - -
Negative binomial (daily)
Weibull (quarterly)
Italy (e) 
Kobayashi & 
Takaguchi (2017)
2000-2015
Interbank money 
market transactions 
(e-MID)
Daily 94 303 - - - - - -
Japan (a) Inaoka et al.  (2004) 2001-2002 Payments Monthly 354 1,727 2.76% - - - - Power law (α=2.1)
Japan (b)
Imakubo & Soejima 
(2010)
1997 and 
2005
Payments Monthly 444 and 354 1,383 and 1,709 1.4% and 2.7% - - Disassortative - Power law (α=1.6-3.4)
Balance sheet 
exposures
280 30% 80% - Disassortative 1.7 Power law (α=3.5)
Payments 471 40% 82% 0.7-0.85 Disassortative 1.5 Power law
Netherlands 
(a)
Pröpper et al. 
(2008)
2005-2006 Payments Daily 129 ± 5 1,182 ± 61 7% 63% ± 2% 0.4 ± 0.02 Disassortative 2.0-2.5 -
Netherlands 
(b)
van Lelyveld & Veld 
(2014)
1998-2008
Balance sheet 
exposures
Quarterly 91-102 ~1,000 8% - - - -
Rejects Poisson and Power 
law
Secured money    
market transactions
161 - 10%-20% 5%-10% 0.05-0.2 - 2-4 -
Unsecured money 
market transactions
241 - 5% 20%-30% 0.1-0.3 - 2.6-3.7 -
27-40
Switzerland Schumacher (2017) 2005-2012
25-day 
periods
Mexico
Martínez-Jaramillo et 
al. (2014)
2005-2010 Daily
𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝑘) ∝ 𝑘
− .5c(𝑘) ∝ 𝑘− . 
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Notes: 1) maximum entropy refers to a method used to estimate some exposures for which no disaggregated data is available, so the number of links does not emerge directly from the observed 
information; 2) c(𝑘) accounts for the number of triangles a node of degree 𝑘 belongs to; 3) 𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝑘) is a function that describes the average degree 𝑘𝑛𝑛 of the neighbors of a node with degree 𝑘; 
4) α refers to the exponent of a Power Law, while μ and σ represent the mean and standard deviation of a Lognormal distr ibution, respectively; 5) Wetherilt, Zimmerman and Soramäki [46] 
divided their analysis in two time phases: the first ranges from 18 May 2006 to 8 August 2007, and the second, from 9 August 2007 to 16 December 2008, so their results are reported here 
separately for each phase. This Table only reports the metrics explicitly mentioned or expressed by the authors of each paper. 
 
 
 
Country Reference Period Data type Frequency N M
1 Density Reciprocity Clustering
2
Assortativity
3
Average 
Distance
Degree distribution
4
UK (a) Becher et al.  (2008) 2003 Payments Daily 337 989 0.90% - 0.23 - 2.4 -
UK (b)
Wetherilt et al. 
(2010)
5 2006-2008
Interbank money 
market transactions
Daily 12-13 - 42.1%-38.5% 70.7%-68.9% - - - -
USA (a)
Soramäki et al. 
(2007)
2004 Payments Daily 5,086 ± 128 76,614 ± 6,151 0.3% ± 0.01% 21.5% ± 0.3% 0.53 ± 0.01 -0.31 2.6 ± 0.2 Power law (α=2.11)
USA (b)
Bech & Atalay 
(2010)
1997-2006
Interbank money 
market transactions 
(federal funds)
Daily 470 ± 15 1,543 ± 72 0.70% ± 0.03% 6.5% ± 0.8%
In: 0.10
Out: 0.28
-0.06 to -0.28
In: 2.4 
Out: 2.7
Out: Power law (α=2 ± 0.05)
In: Negative binomial
Argentina This paper 2003-2017
Interbank money 
market transactions
Monthly 65 ± 6 237.5 ± 73.1 5.5% ± 1.1% 7.9% ± 3% 0.19 ± 0.05 -0.16 ± 0.09 2.8 ± 0.5 Lognormal (μ=1.9 / σ=0.6)
